Professor Lissa Griffin of Pace Law School in New York has posted the above titled article on SSRN. Download article here. The abstract states:
In this article, the author proposes that the prosecution’s obligation to disclose exculpatory information to the defense be formalized by statute, court rule, or internal protocol in ways that would reflect the current state of our knowledge of and experience with both Brady and wrongful convictions. This would improve on the current ineffective constitutional protection — and any existing statutory or rule-based regimes — in several ways. First, such a formalized regime would require disclosure of all materials that are reasonably helpful to the defense. Second, unlike the constitutional doctrine, which provides no reliable mechanism for monitoring police disclosure to the prosecution, an accompanying schedule (or “checklist”) would require specific categories of exculpatory information that the prosecution would have to secure from the police or other investigative agency and then disclose to the defense. Third, the prosecution would be required to certify that it has used due diligence to collect and disclose all of the required information. Fourth, unlike the constitutional Brady rule, which requires the defendant to show materiality whenever suppressed evidence is discovered post-conviction, if suppression of evidence required on the checklist is discovered post-conviction, the burden of proof would shift and the prosecution would be required to prove that the suppression was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As to any other information, the defendant would continue to bear the burden of showing materiality. Finally, there would be a public interest declination exception and a process for the prosecution to apply for a protective order where necessary to protect a witness or another investigation.


Prosecutors, as representatives of the State, have a duty to see that justice is done by their client, according to the Rule of Law.
Professor Griffin has a good idea, but “formalizing” the Brady rule, without <STRONG interest by the bench and bar, is not going to do much good.
It would be tricky to set up, but the immediate threat of death for not performing ones duty is a motivator to perform ones duty well.
Indifference to the job for those who clear mine fields manually or otherwise deal with explosive ordnance is self-correcting.
During the1930s, sailors were far from overpaid and my Dad drove (over my mother’s protests) an oil field truck hauling nitroglycerine. Trust me when I say he had a keen interest in doing that job well.
In the past, Ohio has appeared to show a less than admirable attitude on violation of the Brady rule.
A classic example is Ohio’s Kellogg-Martin case.
The dissent of the late Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer is classic.
Kellogg-Martin is discussed by JAMES J. GROGAN, DACC, Illinois ARDC in Hiding the Ball ? athttp://www.nobc.org/caseofthemonth.aspx?id=3218
DJB, Associate Member OACDL*
*Typing only for me and not for OACDL
☺ Nemo Me Impune Lacessit ☺
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